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Reading for the Law: British Literary History and Gender Advocacy, by Christine L.
Krueger; pp. xi + 301. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010, $39.50.
Law, Literature, and the Transmission of Culture in England, 1837–1925, by Cathrine
O. Frank; pp. 250. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010, £60.00, $114.95.
In the past fifteen years, the study of law and literature has taken an historical turn, and
Victorian culture has proved to be a rich site for analysis. Moving beyond accounts that
posit either necessary alignments or oppositions between legal and literary discourses,
critics have examined the ways in which imaginative writers responded to and anticipated developments in areas such as trial procedure, criminal justice, and intellectual
property. Christine L. Krueger’s and Cathrine O. Frank’s engaging books offer
welcome contributions to this interdisciplinary field. Exploring topics as varied as
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witchcraft trials, lunacy hearings, and charitable trusts, the studies shed new light on
nineteenth-century legal culture, while probing the relationship between law and
narrative, reason and emotion, empiricism and imagination.
Legal scholars tend to emphasize timeless differences between law and literature, and between rule-based and narrative-based forms of advocacy. Law emerges, in
these accounts, as “an authoritarian, rule-bound, patriarchal disciplinary discourse in
need of the antidote of multivoiced, subjective, and oppositional literary discourse”
(Krueger 2). In her wide-ranging and impressive study of nineteenth-century gender
advocacy, Krueger offers a “sympathetic critique” of such claims for literature’s “emancipatory features” (98), while challenging the view that narrative is an “intrinsically
efficacious antidote to . . . positivist rules of legal reasoning” (235). Replacing an ahistorical opposition between law and literature with a “history of their interdependency,
and their embeddedness in print culture,” Krueger argues that “a multidisciplinary
‘historical narrative jurisprudence’ strengthens narrative legal theorists’ claims for the
transformative powers of stories” (2). Her analysis of women’s engagements with the law
in nineteenth-century Britain reveals the uses of literary history for feminist as well as
other “outsider jurisprudence” (3).
Krueger divides her study into four parts. The first part reads Elizabeth
Gaskell’s Lois the Witch (1859) in the context of a long history of witchcraft prosecution.
Deftly surveying changing views of these proceedings from Reginald Scot’s The Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584) and King James I’s Daemonologie in Forme of a Dialogue (1597) to
treatises by Francis Hutchinson, Walter Scott, and William Godwin, Krueger argues
that Gaskell’s novella exemplifies realism’s complex response to the legacy of witchcraft. Rather than theorize the legal system as a universal tool of patriarchal oppression, the text emphasizes the material and political conditions that gave rise to
prosecution in seventeenth-century Salem. Gaskell also acknowledges women’s own
role in the trials, even as she “posits a standard of rationality and realist historical
narrative as defenses against legalized misogyny” (5).
Part 2 turns to literary and legal stories of mental competence, focusing on
Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman (1798), Charles Reade’s Hard Cash
(1863), and mid-century narratives by alleged lunatics. In different ways, all of these texts
reveal the failure of narrative advocacy in a legal system that ties agency to property
ownership. Part 3 considers legal and literary histories of testimony, focusing on novels by
Gaskell, Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna, and George Eliot, as well as depositions in indecent
assault cases from the 1840s and 1850s. The novels reject the law’s authority to credit
women’s testimony, but in the process, they silence female witnesses. The depositions
show that sentimental literary conventions are unreliable not only for women but also for
homosexual men. Reade’s Griffith Gaunt (1866), by contrast, presents women as competent legal speakers, developing a “powerful popular fantasy of pro se representation.” Catherine Gaunt’s successful defense from a charge of murder suggests a view of “the criminal
trial as a discursive site allowing for a uniquely unmediated, potent, and convincing form
of self-representation” (189). For Krueger, these texts show that neither law nor literature
“is intrinsically progressive, or anti-democratic” (198).
In the last part, Krueger takes up the concept of mens rea, or criminal intent.
Narrative legal theorists claim that women and other “outsiders” can best “secure the
empathic identification of legal decision makers” by narrating their own stories and
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thus revealing their feelings and intentions (52). Krueger, however, uses the case of
prison reformer Mary Carpenter to demonstrate the dangers of using omniscient
narration to elicit sympathetic identification with others’ life experiences. She then
turns to a group of writers who developed strategies to conceal characters’ mental
states in order to create “cover stories for jury nullification of the law” (199). First, she
considers representations of infanticide in William Wordsworth’s “The Thorn” (1798),
Scott’s The Heart of Midlothian (1818), and Eliot’s Adam Bede (1859). In the final chapter,
she examines the cover stories at work in Anthony Trollope’s Orley Farm (1862) and in
the 1871 sodomy trial of Ernest Boulton and Frederick Park.
Reading for the Law makes a bold intervention in the study of law and literature,
bringing together legal and literary texts in provocative ways. Krueger not only offers an
important corrective to narrative jurisprudence but uncovers a rich archive of popular
legal culture. At the same time, she opens up new readings of familiar works of fiction.
Some readers may wish that she had further analyzed the canonical texts; Krueger resists
the idea that novels and poems should be read more closely than depositions and petitions. But Krueger convincingly demonstrates the intertwining of rational and aesthetic
discourses, much as she usefully challenges the dichotomy between rule-based and narrative-based advocacy. Krueger is herself an eloquent advocate; her book makes a forceful
case for the relevance of literary history to social and legal change.
Where Krueger blurs the distinctions between legal and literary narrative,
Frank highlights the differences between them. Law, Literature, and the Transmission of
Culture in England examines changing treatments of the last will and testament in
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century law and fiction. The emergence of the will as a
formal, written document, Frank argues, shaped novelistic bequests, enabling writers to
explore the formation and transmission of identity. These representations in turn highlighted tensions between testators and heirs as well as between testators and legal professionals. In the capitalist culture of Victorian England, novelists imagined the will more as
an “empirical register of identity” than an expression of “private, autonomous character”
(6, 3). In the early twentieth century, however, as jurists increasingly embraced social
markers of identity, novelists increasingly turned to the “imperative will—the selfconscious, metaphysical attempt to define one’s self” (8). The changing treatment of
novelistic bequests, Frank argues, elucidates the shift from realism to modernism, while
marking the widening gap between law and literature.
Frank’s study unfolds in three parts. The first part examines the legal and
cultural changes wrought by the Wills Act of 1837, which merged the will and the testament into a single document, repealing nearly a dozen inheritance laws dating back to the
sixteenth century. The new documentary will held great narrative potential: writers saw
in the will the collision of materialism and subjectivity as well as personal agency and legal
restraint. Novels like Wuthering Heights (1847), The Woman in White (1860), Our Mutual
Friend (1864–65), and Middlemarch (1871–72) probe these tensions, exposing the limits of
the law’s ways of ordering the world and revealing literature’s “equal and sometimes more
‘equitable’ ability to define subjectivity and organize social experience” (13). In the
second part, Frank examines tensions between testators and heirs, focusing on inheritances that prove burdensome for daughters and sons. Mid-century novels such as Little
Dorrit (1855–57) and Felix Holt, the Radical (1866) reimagine women’s relationship to property. By renouncing bequests, the heroines exercise the power of alienation while defining
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themselves in non-material terms. Late Victorian and Edwardian novelists like Samuel
Butler, John Galsworthy, and Arnold Bennett also privilege the wishes of heirs over those
of testators, while shifting the focus from documentary wills to metaphysical wills.
The third part takes up will contests and other difficulties interpreting and
implementing testators’ intentions. After sketching a rich history of cy-près—the
doctrine governing the interpretation of charitable trusts—Frank examines the treatment of faith and obligation in Trollope’s The Warden (1855) and Edmund Gosse’s
Father and Son (1907), showing how the “expulsion of the moral and spiritual dimensions of subjectivity from [inheritance law] . . . deprived it of its ability to constitute and
represent human character as fully as literature could” (192). Trollope’s Ralph the Heir
(1871) and Mr. Scarborough’s Family (1883) as well as E. M. Forster’s Howard’s End (1910),
which Frank examines in the next chapter, likewise illustrate the widening gap between
legal and literary models of subjectivity. The conclusion discusses the 1925 Administration of Estates Acts, which completed the will’s transformation into a “uniform and
utilitarian legal text of . . . social identity” (219), before considering Virginia Woolf’s
account of subjective experience in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) and To the Lighthouse (1927).
Law, Literature, and the Transmission of Culture brings together familiar texts in
exciting ways, offering insightful readings of inheritance plots and lucid accounts of legal
developments. Frank’s analyses of the tensions inherent in the idea of the will are particularly astute. The book would benefit, though, from a narrower focus. Frank takes up a
number of issues—materialism, empiricism, agency, ownership, identity—without fully
fleshing out the connections among them or relating them to her discussion of novel
theory. The book’s argument could also be further developed. In tracing a shift from “the
documentary will” to “the imperative will,” the third part rehearses a claim made in the
second part (7). The trajectories that Frank sketches, though, are convincing, as is her
analysis of the growing divergence between law and literature. Storytelling, as Krueger
demonstrates, does not necessarily provide the most effective path to social justice. But
Frank nicely shows that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, novelists offered
more equitable conceptions of ownership and more robust models of selfhood than did
jurists. Together, Krueger’s and Frank’s books offer sophisticated models of the legalliterary nexus as well as subtle accounts of the place of subjectivity in nineteenth-century
legal culture. The breadth and learning of these studies will impress legal scholars and
literary critics alike.
Melissa J. Ganz
Marquette University
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